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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

FEDERAL TAXATION OF "EXEMPT" INCOME

By

A

HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER*

has elapsed since the sixteenth amendment was
adopted as a part of the federal constitution. Congress has,
during that period, imposed general income taxes under five disfinct acts, and so-called war and excess profits taxes under three.
It has in each instance specifically excluded from gross income
the interest derived from the obligations of the states, and their
political subdivisions. This exemption did not materially affect
the direction of investments as long as the rates were comparatively low. The exigencies of war and post-war governmental finance have, however, completely changed the situation.
The surtax rates levied under the War Income Tax Act of 1917,
and the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, were and are exceedingly high. It is apparent that, other things being equal, an investor will select that investment which yields him the maximum
net, as distinguished from the greatest nominal, return. If the
nominal return of one class of investments is subject to reduction
on account of taxes, while the same is not true of another class,
the nominal return on the former will have to be greater than
that on the latter, if the former is to compete successfully with
the latter. The differential will vary with the amount of the reduction, that is with the tax rate. Since the total effective tax rate
varies with the tax payer's total taxable net income (due to the
fact that the sur-tax rates vary with that item) it follows that
no single differential applies to all taxpayers.' The difficulty
DECADE

*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'The following concrete examples may serve to make these matters somewhat plainer. The computations are based on the tax rates
for 1923 under the Revenue Act of 1921.
Assume that A, with a
present taxable net income of $200,000, has a choice of investing in
"non-exempt" or "exempt" securities. If he select the former, the
tax on every dollar of income received will be 58 cents (8% normal
tax; 50% surtax), leaving him a net of 42 cents. If he select the
latter, he retains net 100 cents out of every dollar of income. It follows that, for him, an investment in a "non-exempt" security bearing
a nominal rate of 1% is on a par with an investment in an "exempt"
security bearing a nominal rate of .42%o. The rate on the "nonexempt" security is to that on the "exempt" security as 1 to .42 or
2.38 to 1. If these two types of security are to compete on an equality
for A's funds, the "non-exempt" must bear a nominal return 2.38 times
that of the "exempt." If the rate on the "exempt" is 6%, that on the
"non-exempt" must be slightly in excess of 14%. If, however, A's
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of successful competition is enhanced if the investment, whose income is taxed, normally bears a higher nominal rate than the
exempt security. In the light of this analysis, it is clear why
the high surtax rates that have been in force since 1917 have
driven persons with large incomes to invest in so-called exenipt
securities. The supply of these has consisted largely of the obligations of the states and their various political subdivisions. The
exemption of this income has rested on the theory that its taxation would be unconstitutional. The same applies to the exemption of the compensation paid their officers and employees by
states and their political subdivisions.2 It is the purpose of
this article to examine the correctness of that position.
Whatever power the federal government at present has to tax
this exempt income3 must be derived from the sixteenth amendment. It is not conferred by the grant of the general power to
lay and collect taxes under section 8 of article I. This was determined in 1871 as to the compensation received by state officials
in the case of Buffington v. Day;4 and as to the interest on
state and municipal obligations in 1895 in Pollock v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Company.5 Whatever may be one's opinion as
to the validity of the reasoning by which the principles of McCulloch v. Maryland6 were applied to the situation in which the
positions of the federal and state governments were reversed,7
and whatever one's view on the extension of those principles to
the exemption of income received by private persons, it is now
present taxable net income had been but $6,000, the tax on additions
thereto until the total amounted to $10,000, would be but 9 cents out
of every dollar. In that case, an investment in a "non-exempt" security bearing a nominal rate of 1% is on a par with that in an "exempt"
security bearing a .91% rate; the relation between the nominal rates
is as 1.098 to 1; and a "non-exempt" security bearing a nominal rate
of 6.58 would be on a competitive equality with a 6% "exempt" security. The amount of the "exempt" security's advantage, therefore,
depends on the "taxable net income" position of the person who is
called upon to make the selection. The aniunt of $200,000 was taken
because it is the lower limit of the highest surtax bracket; that of

$6,000, because it is the lowest to which surtaxes apply; and it is the
existence of surtaxes that has made the problem acute.
Similar computations could be made to show how the differential
would
2 vary with an entire readjustment of the surtax schedule.
See regulations 62, art. 88.
3
The terms "exempt income" will be hereinafter used to designate
both the compensation of officers and employees of the states and their
political subdivisions, and the interest on their obligations.

4(1871) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 113, 20 L.Ed. 122.
5(1895) 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759, 15 S.C.R. 673.
6(1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
7

See on this point the dissenting opinion of Bradley J. in Buffing-

ton v. Day, (1871) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 113, 20 L. Ed. 122.
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too late to expect any judicial modification thereof. The question of the taxability of exempt income thus becomes a problem
in construing the scope of the sixteenth amendment.
The sixteenth amendment reads as follows:
"The C6ngress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration."
It is a matter of general information that this amendment
was adopted in order to remove certain limitations and inhibitions upon the federal taxing power. Its purpose was
remedial, and its scope is to be determined in the light, of that
fact. It is essential, therefore, to ascertain the limitations and
inhibitions that existed at the time of its adoption. The constitution expressly confers upon Congress the power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises." This power is expressly
subjected to two limitations upon the manner of its exercise,
and one inhibition as to what subjects may be taxed. Duties,
imposts and excises are required to be uniform throughout the
United States;9 and direct taxes must be apportioned among
the several states according to their population as fixed by the
last census enumeration. 10 Neither taxes nor duties may be
levied on articles exported from a state."
There had been
from time to time frequent controversies as to what taxes were
direct as various kinds were levied by the federal government.
The issue was squarely raised in the Pollock cases12 as to those
levied under the Income Tax Act of 1894 on the income from
real and personal property. Both were held to be direct taxes;
and, since "the law did not provide for their apportionment among
the states on the basis of population, invalid. The cases establishing the exemption of the compensation of state officers and the
SArt.
I, sec. 8.
9
0Art. I, sec. 8.
I Art. I. sec. 2; and Art. I, sec. 9. These two provisions differ
somewhat in their language. Sec. 2 provides that "direct taxes shall
be apportioned among the several states. . . . according to their
respective numbers"; the remainder clearly shows that the "respective
numbers" intended are the decennial census figures. Sec. 9 provides
that "no capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
Observe that section 9 does not in terms refer to an apportionment
among the states. For reasons that are subsequently discussed I have
interpreted the two together in the manner indicated in the text.
"Art. I, sec. 9.
"2(1895) 157 U.S. 429, 39 L. Ed. 759, 15 S.C.R. 673; (1895) 158 U.S.
601, 39 L. Ed. 1108, 15 S.C.R. 912.
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interest on state and municipal obligations have already been
referred to.13
There is a marked difference between the principles on which
the taxes on the income from real and personal property were
declared invalid, and those on which the non-taxability of exempt
income was based. The former were declared unconstitutional
because the law, in imposing them, did not follow the rule of
apportionment;4 the latter because of a want of power in
the federal government to tax such income.' 5 The federal
power to tax did extend to the levy of income taxes that were
direct, but in exercising that power the constitutional limitation
must be observed. This proposition has been vigorously denied.l
It has been contended that the Pollock cases decided
that income taxes on incomes from all sources, except those that
could be sustained as excises, were impossible because they could
not be apportioned as income taxes. Since the construction of
the sixteenth amendment may be affected according as one or
the other of these conflicting views of the Pollock cases is adopted,
it is necessary to consider this contention somewhat at length. It
is clear from the excerpts already set out' 7 that the court which

decided the cases did not so construe its decisions. It is also
opposed to the views expressed by the court in subsequent cases
involving income tax laws enacted under the sixteenth amendment.' 8 The position, therefore, rests on the assumption that
the actual decision was other than what the court conceived it
to be. The ultimate reason for the thesis is that, since an income
tax is one apportioned according to income it is a logical im"3See
notes 4 and 5.' 4 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 158 U.S. 601, 637,
39 L. Ed. 1108, 15 S.C.R. 912. "Our conclusions may, therefore, be
summed up as follows: . . . Third. The tax imposed by sections
twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive, of the Act of 1894, so far as
it falls on the income of real estate and of personal property, being a
direct tax within the meaning of the constitution, and, therefore, un-

constitutional and void because not apportioned according to repre-

sentation, all those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid." See also Hyde v. Continental Trust Co.,

(1895)5 157 U.S. 586.

1 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895)

L. Ed.
759, 15 S.C.R. 673.
6

157 U.S. 429, 39

' The sixteenth amendment: Harry Hubbard, 33 Harvard L. Rev.

794.

17See footnote 14.
-'sSee Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, (1915) 240
U.S. 1, 13, 18, 60 L. Ed. 493, 36 S.C.R. 236, in which the power to levy
income taxes in the generic sense is expressly stated to be included in
the general power to tax.
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possibility to apportion it on a population basis. This is perfectly correct if the same act of apportionment is meant in both
instances. However, the apportionment which is to be made on
a population basis is one among the states; that which is to be
made on an income basis is one among the units of the taxable
class within each state. The logical incongruity thus disappears.
The legal correctness of the thesis, therefore, depends on whether
the constitution permits this double, or more accurately, combination apportionment. Whatever doubt exists as to this arises
from the absence of express authorization of a second apportionment after that on a population basis;19 and from the possibility that the provision that "no capitation, or other direct, tax
shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration
herein before directed to be taken," 20 prescribes a rule for the
distribution of the tax among the individuals in the taxable group.
If no second apportionment is permitted, it would -prevent any
direct tax, except a head tax, for even a direct tax on land would
have to be apportioned on an ad valorem or some other basis.
It has, however, never been doubted that the federal taxing power
comprehended taxes on land based on its value. Furthermore,
this view would reduce to mere verbiage the language "or other
direct, tax." The adoption of the second alternative is certainly
opposed to the general view consistently adopted by the Court,
which has been that the apportionment referred to in article I,
section 9, is the same as that required by article I, section 2. If
they refer to two different acts of apportionment based on the
same rule, even then a head tax is the only conceivable direct tax
permitted, since it alone can be both apportioned among the states,
and distributed within each state, on the basis of population.
This again reduces to mere verbiage the language "or other direct,
tax." Either alternative would convert a limitation upon the
mode in which a power shall be exercised into a denial of the
power to do the act in conformity with the limitation. It follows
that the method contemplated by the constitution in levying direct
taxes was: (1) to apportion the amount levied among the states
according to population; and (2) to distribute the amount thus
apportioned to each state over the taxable units in such state on
the basis applicable to the form of the direct tax; i.e., on an ad
valorem basis for property taxes, and on an income basis for
9
'20
Art. I, sec. 2; art. I, sec. 9.
Art. I, see. 9.
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income taxes.2 1 This is exactly the course followed by Congress in levying direct taxes shortly after the adoption of the
constitution.2 2 It is a cumbersome process, leads to frequent
absurdities, and is almost certain to result in gross inequality in
the tax burden as between the individual taxpayers in the different states. 23 These considerations might well make resort to
direct taxation impracticable, but clearly not impossible. The
court's own view as to its decision in the Pollock cases is clearly
the correct one, and that decision is, on the point in question, in
perfect accord with the constitution.
At the time of the proposal and adoption of the sixteenth
amendment, the federal power to tax incomes thus suffered from
two patent defects. The holding in the Pollock cases that taxes
on the income from real and personal property were direct made
the incorporation of a general income tax into the fiscal policy of
the government a practical, though not a legal, impossibility. The
requirement of their apportionment among the states on the population basis effectually blocked its adoption. The legal necessity
for exempting a considerable body of income constituted another
drawback. The Pollock cases had called attention to both. If,
therefore, the language of the sixteenth amendment can, without
doing it violence, be construed to reach both the limitation upon
the manner of exercising an existing power, and the want of
power, the rule that the scope of remedial legislation should be
determined in the light of the evils to be cured clearly warrants
the adoption of that interpretation. No one denies that it has
freed such income taxes as are direct from the requirement of
the apportionment rule. The sole question is as to whether it
has operated to confer a power to tax that did not theretofore
exist.
The sixteenth amendment is in form a grant of power. In
this respect it differs essentially from those constitutional pro21
See 33 Harvard L. Rev. 794, 808, footnote (18); in which this
view is rejected as entailing absurd results. It is a sufficient answer

that the possibility of such results is a slender foundation on which
to base an emendation of the federal constitution, especially when

Congressional action practically contemporaneous with its adoption
indicates that the provisions in question were construed in precisely
the manner indicated. This is the more true where such emendation
is ultimately
based on an alleged logical incongruity.
22
See 1 Stat. at L. 597 (1798); also the acts cited in Veazie Bank
v.. Fenno,
(1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 533, 542, 19 L. Ed. 482.
23
See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 157 U.S. 429,
39 L. Ed. 759, 15 S.C.R. 673; wherein Chief Justice Fuller remarks at
pp. 582, 583, that: "This inequality must be held to have been contemplated."
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visions that impose the requirement of apportionment. If the sole
intention had been to abolish that limitation on the existing taxing power, the form selected is a rather confusing way of expressing it. It is a familiar canon of interpretation that the
natural meaning of the language used governs. The existing
limitation could have been removed by a simple statement that:
"Direct taxes on income shall not -be required to be apportioned
among the several states, nor according to any census or enumeration." Had this, or some similar, form been adopted, the limited
end would have been fully secured, and that without any ambiguity. Framing it as a grant of power has certainly created uncertainty of meaning if so narrow a scope was intended. The
choice is, therefore, between imputing some rational significance
to this fact, and considering it as an unfortunate and confusing
selection of language. The latter alternative involves a repudiation of the rule that, if possible, effect should be given to every
term in a written document, a principle which is certainly not
less applicable in the construction of constitutional amendments
than in interpreting ordinary legislation. The most reasonable
view, therefore, is that casting the amendment in terms of a
grant of power had some purpose; and that, if possible, some
meaning must be attached to it.
It was hereinbefore stated that the construction of the sixteenth amendment might depend upon which view of the Pollock
cases were adopted. If those cases are held to have decided that
the federal power did not extend to the taxation of incomes, except
in the form of an excise, then, at the time of the adoption of
the amendment, there existed a want of power in respect of both
income taxes that were direct and such taxes on exempt income.
In that case a grant of power would be necessary even before
direct income taxes could be levied. It could then be argued that
the form of language used in the amendment was adopted to cure
that particular defect of power, and was to be thus limited. In
that case proponents of a liberal construction of its terms would
be compelled to rely chiefly on the language, "from whatever
source derived.

' 24

If, however, the Pollock cases are construed

as having decided that direct income taxes must conform to the apportionment rule, as the court itself has interpreted its own decision, then the only want of power that existed to tax income was
that to levy on exempt income. If, then, the language used has aiy
24
The significance of this phrase will subsequently be more fully
discussed.
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significance, it can .be found only by connecting it with that defect
of power. It is, therefore, less difficult to establish the present
taxability of exempt income if the court's own view of the
Pollock cases is adopted. It is possible, on either view, to find
some purpose and meaning in the fact that the amendment is
framed as a grant of power; the adoption of the court's own
theory makes it absolutely necessary to find that purpose and
meaning in the removal of an incapacity to tax exempt income, for
it would be absurd to confer upon the federal government a
power that it already possessed. Correct principles of construction require the adoption of that one of the possible views which
will give effect and attach significance to every term used, and
which gives them their natural and usual meaning. It is scarcely
reasonable to treat as inconsequential the fact that Congress, in
proposing the amendment, chose to frame it in terms of a grant
of power; it would be even less so to consider it as an inexact
use of language by the legislative body, when a different explanation is possible. The preceding discussion has shown that another
is available. It is, therefore, preferable to accept the view that
the amendment constitutes a grant of power to tax that income to
which the federal taxing power did not extend at the time of
its adoption, viz., the so-called exempt income.
The power to tax exempt income is frequently supported by
a reference to the language "from whatever source derived," which
forms a part of the amendment. That language, standing by
itself, clearly could not become a source of power. If, for example, the amendment had read: "Direct taxes on income, from
whatever source derived, shall not be required to be apportioned
among the several states, nor according to any census or enumeration," no one would contend that any power to tax exempt or
any other income was 'thereby conferred. The language under
discussion is, however, important in determining the extent of
the power granted, assuming that some power is conferred. The
crux of the problem is whether there is any such grant, a matter
which has already been discussed. The use of this language raises
two questions: (1) Does it afford any evidence in support of the
view that the amendment was intended as a grant of power ;23
and (2) assuming that there is such grant, how is its scope affected
thereby? While it would be difficult to find in it any affirmative
argument to establish a grant of power, its presence increases
25

It will no doubt be conceded that it could not be rationally con-

strued as evidence that no grant of power was intended.
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the difficulties of those who base the restriction of the amendment's scope on the reasoning that it confers no power to tax.
That view limits the operation of the amerdment to removing
the requirement of apportioning direct income taxes among the
states according to population. It necessarily treats as unimportant the fact that it reads: "The Congress shall have the
power, etc." Admitting the correctness of that position, the conclusion by no means follows. The limited purpose imputed to
the amendment could equally well have been attained by having
it read: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes without apportionment among the states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." This would have
removed the requirement of apportionment as to every income
tax to which it constitutionally applied with less probability than
now exists that it would be construed as having intended to
accomplish something more. The very addition of the expression
"from whatever source derived" does suggest that something
more was intended. It may be mere surplusage; if so, its only
effect has been to create confusion. Or it may have been put
in from an excess of caution to guard against possible danger
that, without it, the amendment might be held not to relieve from
the apportionment rule some income taxes to which it applied;
if so, it seems entirely superfluous since the term "incomes" without qualification seems as inclusive as possible. The language in
question acquires real significance only if it be construed as intended to accomplish some positive result. Its importance is
rather negative in relation to the purpose to abolish the apportionment rule as to income taxes. The most reasonable explanation is that it constitutes a part of some other principle embodied
in the amendment. Considering the fact that certain income was
at the time exempt because of its source, the language is exactly
adapted to emphasize the inclusion of that income within the
taxing power conferred. It is undeniable that it might be more
difficult to maintain the broad view of the amendment's scope if
the language had been omitted; it is equally clear that its inclusion makes that purpose practically certain. On the one view
it is explicable only as surplusage or as due to an excess of
caution; on the other it acquires positive meaning and emphasizes
what might otherwise have been ambiguous. The latter is clearly
preferable as being the more reasonable. The presence of the
language, therefore, reinforces the considerations already adduced
in warranting an inference that the sixteenth amendment is a
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grant of power; and, since the power to tax all but exempt incomes already existed, that this grant applies to it.
The position that the sixteenth amendment should be broadly
construed ultimately rests on two propositions: (1) That it constitutes a grant of power to tax; and (2) that, as such, it confers, not a power that the federal government already possessed,
but a new one, viz., to levy incomes taxes on exempt income. The
discussion thus far has definitely established the former. Is it,
however, possible to maintain that it does not confer a new power,
but merely regrants an existing one? It is in this connection
.that the phrase "from whatever source derived" becomes of
greatest importance. It defines the scope of the power conferred
by designating the incomes comprehended within it. No language could be more inclusive. It savors of logical absurdity to
convert language so sweeping in character into a source of restrictions. To do so would violate almost every recognized canon of
interpretation. It would be opposed to the natural meaning of the
language, and reduce it to mere surplusage. If, even in the case
of ordinary statutes, courts will if possible construe them so as
to give meaning to every term, a fortiori is that true when a
constitutional amendment is involved. The most reasonable inference is that the expression was intended to accomplish some
result which would not be as certainly secured if the phrase had
been omitted. The regrant of the power to levy direct income
taxes, and their relief from existing qualifications, are adequately
and more certainly secured by its omission. However, a doubt
might remain as to whether more was intended, which would be
removed by the language in question. This view gives it significance, and is for that reason alone preferable to that which
reads into it a restrictive character. But the only other purpose
which it could have been intended to realize was to subject exempt
income to the taxing power. The language is fully adequate and
completely adapted to secure that result. It follows that the most
reasonable construction is to consider the expression as giving
to the power granted a scope sufficiently broad to include the
taxation of exempt income. The sixteenth amendment is not a
mere regrant of a power already possessed, nor yet a mere freeing
of an existing power from a cumbersome limitation; it also confers
a power to tax theretofore not belonging to the federal government, viz., the power to lay income taxes on exempt income.
Congress has never yet given the Supreme Court an opportunity to pass on the specific question whether exempt income is

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

taxable under the sixteenth amendment. The Court has, however, frequently indicated that it does not adopt the construction
contended for in the preceding discussion. In the first important
case arising under the amendment, it stated that:
"It is clear on the face of this text that it [the Amendment]
does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a general sense,-an authority already possessed and never questioned,
-or to limit or distinguish between one kind of income taxes
and another, but that the whole purpose of the Amendment was
to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from
a consideration of the source whence the income was derived."'20
These expressions of opinion are, however, pure dicta on the
problem of the taxability of exempt income. Are they equally
such on the question whether the amendment extends the federal
taxing power to new subjects? They clearly purport to deny that
proposition. Before the amendment that power extended to the
taxation of incomes from professions, personal services, and
property, excluding only exempt income and salaries constitutionally exempted from diminution. The income tax laws since
enacted have, with the exception hereinafter noted, taxed only such
incomes as were within the power prior to its adoption. All
cases arising under those laws, except Evans v. Gore,27 have involved the taxability of income of those classes. There has, therefore, been no occasion to pass on this matter except in that single
case. That involved the taxability of the salary of a federal
judge whose appointment to office ante-dated the amendment.,
The action was one for the recovery of taxes alleged to have
been illegally collected. The plaintiff's contention was that the
imposition of a tax on his judge's salary amounted to a reduction
of that salary contrary to the provisions of article III, section
2
1. 1 A divided court upheld this position.
In the course of its
opinion, it expressed the view that "the purpose of the amendment was to eliminate all occasion for such an apportionment because of the source from which the income came ;''29 and
stated that:
"The genesis and words of the amendment unite in showing that it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
26Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., (1916) 240 U.S. 1, 18,
60 L. Ed. 493, 36 S.C.R. 236.
27(1920) 253 U.S. 245, 64 L. Ed. 887, 40 S.C.R. 550.
28
Art. III, sec. 1. "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts .... shall, at stated times receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
29Evans v. Gore, (1920) 253 U.S. 245, 261, 64 L. Ed. 887, 40 S.C.R.
550.
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subjects, but merely removes all occasion otherwise existing for
an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income,
whether derived from one source or another." 30
This is emphatic and unambiguous language; and it would be
futile to deny that the question was involved in the case, although
only in a very limited manner. The real issue was whether, in
view of the express provisions of the judiciary article, the sixteenth amendment could be deemed to' confer a power to tax
the salaries of federal judges. The language "from whatever source
derived" is on its face broad enough to cover it. To so interpret
it, however, would effect a repeal by implication of a part of
the judiciary article. It is a well recognized principle that repeals
by implication are not favored when the supposed repealing act
relates to a different subject matter than the act repealed. In
such case the fact of a resulting inconsistency is far from conclusive that a repeal was intended. The Evans case decided no
more than that the sixteenth amendment, which dealt with taxation, did not by implication repeal another express constitutional
provision relating to the judiciary;3 and that whatever power
it may confer does not extend to the taxation of a judge's salary
not theretofore taxable. This is far from a decision that it
confers no new power whatever to tax, and by no means forecloses that question. The doctrine of the non-taxability of exempt
income itself rests on implications; it and the sixteenth amendment both deal with the subject of taxation, even though the
rule be but a special case of a broader principle. There is more
reason to deduce from an inconsistency between them an inference that the former was intended to be repealed than in the case
of a judge's salary. There is an inconsistency between continuing
the exemption in full force and the language of the amendment
that Congress shall have the power to tax incomes "from whatever source derived." It may be that the Court will ultimately
decide that this is only an apparent one; the purpose here is
merely to show that it has not yet done so. The question is,
therefore, still an open one as far as the Court is concerned.
The persistence throughout the cases of the restricted view
of the amendment's scope must, however, be taken account of.
It is bound to make it more difficult to secure the adoption of
the competing view. There are some rather formidable arguments
3

OIdem, pp. 261, 262.

31

1n this discussion of the Evans case, I have assumed the correct-

ness of the Court's position that to tax a judge's salary constitutes a
diminution thereof.
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supporting the former. The court adverted to one of these in
Evans v. Gore. Referring to the fact that Governor Hughes of
New York, in laying the amendment before the legislature for
adoption or rejection, had suggested the possibility of the broad
construction, the court remarked:
"But his message promptly brought forth from statesmen
who participated in proposing the amendment such convincing
exposition of its purpose, as here stated, that the
' 32 apprehension
was effectively dispelled and ratification followed.

This appeal to Congressional intentions is not conclusive,"
for amending the constitution is not a legislative act of Congress,
but of the states; but it would be futile to minimize its importance.
Its force will depend almost entirely upon the degree of ambiguity
that the language of the amendment reveals. It cannot be resorted
to to negative the natural import of the expressions used. There is
a possible explanation of the phrase " from whatever source derived" which reduces the force of the arguments heretofore based
thereon. The Pollock cases, in declaring the income tax law of
1894 invalid (except as exempt incomes were involved) had emphasized the source from which the income was derived. It had
stressed the fact that the tax was levied on income from real and
personal property. It is conceivable, and even not improbable,
that the phrase was used in view of that emphasis to make it
absolutely certain that those portions of the Pollock cases were
being set aside. The combined effect of these considerations and
the expressions used in the Congressional debates interpose a
formidable obstacle to the easy acceptance of the broad view. The
view just stated does not seem as reasonable as those heretofore
expressed on the significance of this expression, and in any case
furnishes no explanation of the fact that the amendment is
phrased as a.grant of power. An examination of the entire
account shows a credit balance in favor of the liberal construction, but there are items on the debit side.
The argument thus far has aimed solely to discover which
construction was logically the more consistent with the usual principles of interpretation. On the assumption most favorable to
the restricted view, that method leaves the result in doubt. A con550.

32Evans v. Gore, (1920) 253 U.S. 245, 261, 64 L. Ed. 887, 40 S.C.R.
33

See on the question of the value of Congressional debate as an
aid in irnterpreting legislation the following -cases: Maxwell v. Dow,
(1900) 176 U.S. 581, 601, 602, 44 L. Ed. 597, 20 S.C.R. 448, 20 S.C.R.
494; Downes v. Bidwell, (1901) 182 U.S. 244, 254, 45 L. Ed. 1088,-21
S.C.R. 770.

FEDERAL TAXATION OF "EXEMPT" INCOME

sideration of the political, economic and social consequences of
the adoption of one or the other of competing views is a legitimate procedure in determining constitutional issues, particularly
where the logical method has left the matter uncertain. As long
as the exemption exists, states and their political subdivisions
enter the capital market with a distinct advantage over private
borrowers. The tendency of capital to seek tax-free investment
has today become almost notorious. Its owners are rather loudly
condemned for acting as enlightened self-interest dictates. The
result has been to encourage municipal borrowing, and some observers attribute the prevailing public extravagance largely to
this factor. It has undoubtedly diverted capital from more productive fields, and retarded commercial and industrial expansion
and development. It constitutes a serious impairment of the full
effectiveness of the federal taxing power, and increases the difficulty of fairly distributing the tax burden. On the other hand, it
does facilitate state and municipal projects of various kinds;
persons with different social theories will reach conflicting conclusions as to whether or not this is desirable. The most serious
consideration militating against the broad construction is the
danger that the federal government might use its power to injure
the interests of the states. This danger is the ultimate reason
on which the exemption originally rested. No such injury would
result as long as the tax rates on exempt income were no higher
than on other classes of income. This would establish equality
between the states, the federal government, and private enterprise. The probability that a Congress composed of representatives from the various states will ever discriminate against them
in favor of private enterprise is so remote as to be practically
impossible; the likelihood that it will discriminate in favor of the
federal government is somewhat greater, but such discrimination
is not as likely to entail serious consequences. States have survived, and been able to carry on all their functions, even though
their securities and the income therefrom are taxable by other
states.34 It seems rather fantastic to find their existence endangered by granting like powers to a government in which they
are all represented. The states' police power has not been destroyed because the Supreme Court has held that, if they engaged
in the business of dispensing liquors even as a police measure for
purposes of controlling that traffic, the business is subject to
34
Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore, (1882)
592, 26 L. Ed. 845.
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Considerations

of political and eco-

nomic policy had their influence on that decision. If probabilities
rather than possibilities are considered, the danger to the states
becomes practically infinitesimal. An evaluation of these considerations but reinforces the conclusion that the sixteenth amendment should be construed to extend the federal taxing power to
exempt income. The spell long cast over legal reasoning on this
problem by the famous dictum that the power to tax is the power
to destroy affords but a slender basis on which to predicate a
contrary principle.
It is generally recognized that the exemption of a considerable
mass of income constitutes a grave defect in the present scheme
of federal income taxation. Another constitutional amendment
has been suggested as a remedy, even before the Supreme Court
has had an opportunity to pass on the necessity therefor. There
seems to exist a legislative opinion that the matter has been practically settled by previous adjudications. This discussion has
aimed to show that this is an ill-founded assumption. Congressional action taxing this exempt income is not so certainly condemned to futility. On the contrary, the case for its taxability
under the sixteenth amendment is stronger than for its continued
exemption. That Congressional debates at the time of its submission support the restricted view of its scope is not' decisive.
The fourteenth amendment has been extended far beyond what
its framers had in mind, because its language was broader. than
that rather definite purpose. The same is true of the language of
the sixteenth amendment. The theory underlying the statutory
exemption of interest on the obligations of states and their political subdivisions, and the exemption by official regulation of the
salaries of their officers and employees, is probably incorrect. It
is at least of doubtful validity. There is no reason why the
matter should be allowed to go by default.
"5South Carolina v. United States, (1905) 199 U.S. 437, 50 L. Ed.
261, 26 S.C.R. 110. In this case the Court admitted that the control
of the liquor traffic was an exercise of the police power, a governmental power. It, however, distinguished between duties of a public,
and acts of a private, character. "It is reasonable to hold that, while
the former [federal government] may do nothing by taxation in any
form to prevent the full discharge by the latter [state] of its governmental functions, yet, whenever the state engages in a business which
is of a private nature, that business is not withdrawn from the taxing power of the nation." It is interesting to speculate whether this
language does not warrant the taxation of income from state and
municipal bonds issued to finance such non-governmental functions as
municipalities frequently engage in, even apart from the question of
scope of the sixteenth amendment.

